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Abstract—Wide are monitoring, protection and control
(WAMPAC) plays a critical role in smart grid development.
Since WAMPAC frequently has the tasks of executing control
and protection actions necessary for secure operation of power
systems, its reliability is essential. This paper proposes a novel
approach to the reliability analysis of WAMPAC systems.
WAMPAC  system  functions  are  first  divided  into  four
subsystems: the measured inputs, the communication, the
actuator and the analytic execution subsystems. The reliability
indices of the subsystems are computed then using Monte Carlo
approach. A sensitivity analysis is also described to illustrate the
influence of different components on the system reliability.
Index Terms—Reliability,  wide  area  networks,  wide  area
measurements, Monte Carlo methods
I. INTRODUCTION
A WAMPAC system includes a wide range of power
system applications in the area of monitoring, protection and
control. It operates over a wide area communication network,
connecting with various number of sensors and actuators [1].
Reliability analysis is important both for the design and
operation  of  such  a  system.  A  WAMPAC  system  may  fail
when any of its subsystem such as communication or actuators
fail and may consequently lead to serious and costly
consequences. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the
reliability of WAMPAC system quantitatively.
Reliability in power systems has been extensively studied.
There is a significant number of reliability assessment
methodologies for power system applications [2-4]. The
methods employed are mostly based on either analytical or
simulation approaches. Examples of analytical approaches are
Reliability Block Diagram, Event Tree, Fault Tree and Marko
Modelling methods [5]. Simulation approach are often based
on Monte Carlo or simulations with stochastic distribution
methods. Reference [6] provides a detailed reliability
assessment of operational functions of a power system control
centre. Reference [7] evaluates the reliability of a SCADA
system considering its performance requirements. Both of
these approaches are using the method of fault tree analysis.
There is little work on the assessment of WAMPAC
system reliability. Discussions can be found only focusing
over wide area communications [8]. In principle, the same
reliability analysis approach applied to SCADA or control
centre can be adopted for WAMPAC system. It is however
infeasible to model a large number of real system components
and their dependent reliability characteristics by analytical
approaches. Thus, they are not suitable for WAMPAC system
reliability analysis. Especially when state estimation methods
are employed, it is impossible to put the system into analytical
blocks. Also analytical approach have difficulties to consider
communication delays.
To overcome the limitations of the analytical methods, this
paper presents a novel and alternative approach to reliability
analysis of WAMPAC system. WAMPAC system functions
are first divided into four subsystems: measurement input, the
wide area communication, the actuator and the analytic
execution subsystems. The reliability indices of the entire
system are then computed using simulation (a Monte Carlo
approach). A sensitivity analysis illustrates also the process of
evaluation the importance of different system components.
II. WAMPAC SYSTEM RELIABILITY
WAMPAC systems are often based on the new data
acquisition technology of phasor measurement units (PMUs).
These PMUs are placed at selected primary substations to
obtain measurements by sensors and to execute control actions
through actuators. The PMUs are able to report their
measurement values upwards to a hierarchy of substations for
phasor data concentrators (PDCs), then to network control
centres through available communication networks [9]. A
centralized control unit, often located in a control centre, make
decisions and sends control signals back to the actuators
through remote terminal units (RTUs) or PMUs.
Figure  1  shows  a  simplified  sketch  of  a  WAMPAC
system. A WAMPAC operation presupposes a wide area
communication network, which may have different structures
depending the communication media and security
requirements [10]. In practice, the physical communication
network normally consists of a broadband backbone.
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Figure 1. Sketch of a WAMPAC application
A. Failure analysis of WAMPAC system
A WAMPAC system includes a wide range of power
system applications in the area of monitoring, protection and
control.  A  WAMPAC  system  may  fail  when  the  operator  is
unable to retrieve data from or issue controls to associated
buses/devices. The cause and effect diagram also known as
fishbone diagram is used here to illustrate the possible causes
of  a  WAMPAC  system  failure,  as  shown  in  Figure  2.  A
WAMPAC system can be divided into four subsystems: the
measurement input, the wide area communication, the actuator
and the analytic execution subsystems. Each subsystem is a
combination of various of system components, such as router,
circuit breakers and PMUs.
Figure 2. Failure causes of a WAMPAC system
For example, a measurement input subsystem consists
measurement instruments such as CT and VT, a local
communication network and PMU devices. The functional
structure of this subsystem can be described as Figure 3.
Figure 3. System structure of a measurement input subsystem
The reliability of such a measurement input subsystem is
then obtained by combined reliability of the component
(measurement instruments, PMU, local communication) in a
series configuration as described as:
𝑅(𝑆௜) = 𝑅(𝑝ଵ) ∙ 𝑅(𝑝ଶ) ∙ 𝑅(𝑝ଷ) (1)
where 𝑅(𝑆௜) denotes the reliability of measurement input
subsystem 𝑆௜, 𝑅(𝑝ଵ),𝑅(𝑝ଶ),𝑅(𝑝ଷ) denote the reliability of
component 1, 2, 3 (measurement instruments, PMU and local
communication) respectively. If the reliability of all
components of the subsystem is known to be same as 0.99, the
reliability of the subsystem is 0.99 × 0.99 × 0.99 = 0.9703.
B. Wide area communication subsystem
The subsystem actuator, analytic execution subsystem can
be also modulated as the example as measurement input
subsystem. The wide area communication subsystems are
however more complicated. They consist of a broadband
backbone and of user access equipment such as modems,
routers or multiplexers. The backbone network uses mostly
fiber optic cables, but may be supplemented by copper wire
and  microwave radio sections, and – for WANs operated by
power transmission utilities – also by power line carrier
communication (PLC) links. WAMPAC systems normally
include one or several PDCs that collect and sort the data from
the PMUs. The reliability of WAN might be different at
different user access points due to various numbers of
communication hubs the measurements at the access points
must go through to reach the control centre. The reliability of
such a subsystem then must be accessed case by case for each
measurement input, actuator  and analytic execution
subsystem.
C. Importance of WAMPAC subsystem and components
It is obvious that some components (such as routers,
PDCs) in a WAMPAC system are more important for the
system reliability than other components. A component in
series with the rest of the system will, for example, be at least
as important as any other component in the system. There are
various measures defined for the importance of components
[11], such as Birnbaum’s measure, the improvement potential
measure. Birnbaum’s measure can be described as:
𝐼(𝑝௜) = 𝑅൫1௣௜൯ − 𝑅൫0௣௜൯  (2) 
where 𝐼(𝑖) is the importance measure of component 𝑝௜, 
𝑅൫1௣௜൯ is the system reliability when the reliability of 
component 𝑝௜ = 1, 𝑅൫0௣௜൯ is the system reliability when 
the reliability of component 𝑝௜ = 0. 
The importance of components not only depends on its
location and function, but also on the WAMPAC applications.
A component may be very important for a wide area control
application but may have little, or no importance for a wide
are monitoring application.
D. WAMPAC system reliability assessment appraoch
The computational procedure for reliability analysis of a
WAMPAC system is defined as follows:
1) Evaluate the reliability of subsystems: measurement
input, actuator and analytic execution using the
method introduced in section B.
2) Evaluate the data requirements for examining
WAMPAC application by defining the inputs and
outputs of the application.
3) Gather all available measurement input subsystems.
4) Build a graph by assigning all available measurement
input subsystems and actuator subsystems as the leaf
nodes, anlytic excution subsystems as the root node,
the wide area communication subsystem components
such as routers as the connecting nodes. The wide
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graph.
5) Perform Monte Carlo simulation as follows:
6) Calculate the reliability by 𝑅 = 𝑁௙ 𝑁ൗ , where 𝑅 is the
system reliabiliyt, 𝑁 is the Monte Carlo simuation
number, and 𝑁௙ is the recorded system failure
number.
The graph theory is applied in the simulation. The
communication delays due to communication lines are taken
into account as the weights of edges. The communication
delays due to routers and PDCs processing are considered as
the weights of connecting nodes.  The computation delays at
the analytic execution subsystems are considered as the
weights of the root nodes.
State estimation can give an estimation of the system state
variables of the system based on existing measurements. A
state estimation may be used but it is not necessary. One of the
advantages of employment of state estimation is the loss of
some measurements may not halt the WAMPAC application.
One of the disadvantages  is the increased computation delays.
The reliability of state estimation is also a concern.
III. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
An example network equipped with a loading shedding
scheme implemented based on WAMPAC demonstrates the
proposed reliability analysis approach.
A. Test network and assumptions
The example network considered is shown in Figure 4. A
distinct generation centre can be found in the area north of Cut
1, which contain three major generators and some shunt
compensation but only a few minor loads. Between Cuts 1 and
2 is an area with no generation equipment and only a few
minor loads. South of Cut 2 is an area with predominantly the
characteristics of load.
Figure 4. Single line diagram of the used test system
In the example a voltage stability protection can be
achieved by load shedding controls at buses 17, 22 and 25.
The complete engineered voltage stability management logic
can be seen in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Load shedding logic used in the case study
It is assumed that the application is PMU-based. In total,
21  PMUs and 3  RTUs are  placed  in  the  system as  shown in
TABLE I.  The voltage stability evaluation and load shedding
scheme logic are executed at the control centre. It must have
voltage and current status of substation 6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24
through PMUs or based on state estimation and send control
signals to substation 17, 22 and 25 through RTUs.
TABLE I. PMU AND RT LOCATION IN THE TEST NETWORK
PMUs RTUs
Substation number 1, 2,3,4,5,
6,13,14,15,16,24 17,22,25
Loop 1:N (Monte Carlo simulation)
Generate status of all the nodes and link
in the graph based on reliability;
Find all shortest path trees from
available leaf nodes to root nodes;
if a node is disconnected
     related node is disabled;
end
if latency > threshold
     related node is disabled;
end
Observability analysis if it exists;
if system is not observable or required
actuator nodes is not available
      record as system failure 𝑁௙
end
end
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 The reliability value of system components are presented
as failure rate. The numbers used for the simulations are listed
in TABLE II. The reliability value is calculated by (constant
failure rate is assumed):
𝑅(𝑝௜ , 𝑡) = 𝑒ିఒ௧ (3)
where 𝑅(𝑝௜ , 𝑡) is the reliability of component 𝑝௜ at time 𝑡, 𝜆
is the constant fault rate. Here it is also assumed that the
reliability does not change with 𝑡. So 𝑡 = 1.
The latency requirements vary with applications.
Depending on the control function, cycle response times for
wide area control range from minutes down to 10ms [12]. In
the case studies, it is assumed that the latency limit for the
load shedding scheme is 1s.
TABLE II. RELIABILITY AND LATENCY VALUE APPLIED IN TEST
failure/year reliability Latency
Communication line 500x10-6 0.9995 1ms
Routing nodes 500x10-6 0.9995 1ms
Routers 500x10-6 0.9995 1ms
PMUs, RTUs 500x10-6 0.9995 20ms
Circuit breakers 500x10-6 0.9995 20ms
Sensors 500x10-6 0.9995 20ms
Local communication 500x10-6 0.9995 1ms
Control centre 500x10-6 0.9995 20ms
The routing nodes may consist of various numbers of high-performance routers.
B. Simulations
The communication infrastructure is simplified in the case
studies. The PMUs are assumed to reside in substations,
connected to a local area network, which is connected via a
substation router to a WAN. The PMU based application –
load shedding resides at a central location connected to WAN
through local communication.
In order to evaluate the reliability for the load shedding
scheme, a number of cases are simulated. Two communication
structures are evaluated:
 Case A: ring connection. A skeletal network structure
is shown in Figure 6. The octagon shape nodes 𝑅௜
(𝑖 = 1,2,3,4) represent 4 routing nodes on the
backbone network. The backbone network  has a ring
topology in this case. The routing nodes may consist
of various numbers of high-performance routers. The
circle shape nodes 𝑆௜ (𝑖 = 1,2,… ,24) represents the
PMU-equipped substation. The circle shape CE
represents the control centre. Substations 1,2,3,6, 13
and 14 are connected to R2. Substations 17, 22 and 25
are connected to R4. Substations 4, 5, 15, 16 and 24
are connected to R2. CE is connected to R1.
 Case B: meshed connection. A skeletal network
structure is shown in Figure 7. The backbone network
in this case is completely meshed. Others are same as
in Case A.
 Case C: hierarchical connection. A skeletal network
structure  is  shown  in  Figure  8.   Here  the  PDCs  are
applied to gather all the data.  The substations are
connected to PDCs through WAN. CE is connected to
PDCs also through WAN.
Figure 6. Ring connection of backbone network skeletal structure
Figure 7. Meshed connection of backbone network skeletal structure
Figure 8. Hierachical connection skeletal structure
The substations are first examined and the reliability value
of the substations of measurements input, actuator and
analytic execution are calculated using the method introduced
in section II.A. The results are listed in Table III.
TABLE III. SIMULATION RESULT -1  SYSTEM RELIABILITY
substations types ofsubsystems
reliability
s1,2,3,6,13,14
measurement
input
0.9980
s4,5,3,15,16,24
measurement
input
0.9980
s17,22,25 actuator 0.9980
The three cases are simulated, first without state
estimation,  then with state estimation. Some of test results are
presented in TABLE IV. It can be seen that the hierarchical
connection has the worst reliability. It is true because all the
measurements connected to the PDC will lost if the
communication link between PDC and CE is no more
available.
R1
CE
R4R2
R3
R1
CE
R4R2
R3
CE
PDC PDC PDCR2 R3 R4
R1
TABLE IV. SIMULATION RESULT -1  SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Case A Case B Case C
non state
estimation 0.986 0.99 0.95
State estimation 0.994 0.996 0.98
Simulations also carried out to illustrate the importance of
system components. The measure of importance is calculated
based on the Birnbaum’s measure as introduced in Section
II.C.  The results are shown in TABLE V.
TABLE V. SIMULATION RESULT 2 – SYSTEM RELIABILITY
IMPROVEMENT
case A
components R1 S1
no state
estimation
Reliability=1 0.986 0.986
Reliability=0 0 0.98
improvement 0.986 0.006
case B
R1 S1
no state
estimation
Reliability=1 0.990 0.990
Reliability=0 0 0.991
improvement 0.99 0.001
case C
R1 S1
no state
estimation
Reliability=1 0.95 0.956
Reliability=0 0 0.947
improvement 0.95 0.009
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Generally analytical methods are applied to reliability
analysis  for  SCADA  or  control  centre  applications.  It  is
however difficult to apply analytical approach to the reliability
analysis for WAMPAC system applications due to the large
number of system components involved and the complexity of
wide area communication network structure. In this paper, a
simulation based reliability analysis approach is presented.
This approach allows handling the complexity of the
WAMPAC system applications.
The proposed approach is based on Monte Carlo
simulations. A WAMPAC system is first divided into four
types of subsystems: measurement input, actuator, wide area
communication and analytic execution subsystems. Then
subsystems are mapped into graph nodes and edges. The
shortest path tree search is employed to find all the available
measurements and control signals communication paths with
minimal delay in the system. The latency caused due to
communication or computation are modelled as the weights of
graph nodes and edges. The influence of state estimation on
reliability of the WAMPAC system can also be analysed by a
observability analysis in this approach.
Several case studies are performed to demonstrate the
potential of the proposed approach on WAMPAC system
evaluation, design and planning.
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